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Introduction
Over the past few decades the term "conservancy" has gained increasing usage in Southern 
Africa and elsewhere. In Zimbabwe the term ha© generally been applied to wildlife and habitat 
management units on private land and as the size and number of these units has expanded 
calls for a "conservancy policy" have arisen. Focused as they are on commercial farm land, 
such calls could be held to have little direct relevance for the CAMPFIRE Programme and its 
operations in communal land. Such a view would however be myopic if not careless. A poorly 
conceived conservancy policy and cognate legislation could impact negatively on the 
CAMPFIRE Programme Conversely, the conservancy concept, properly designed and 
articulated in policy and practice, has the potential to enhance the success of CAMPFIRE. 
This discussion paper looks at conservancy policy from the perspective of the Rural District 
Council (RDC) and communal farmer interests, exploring some of the issues involved and 
making suggestions on processes which can capitalise on the potential of the concept to 
benefit CAMPFIRE'S constituency.
1. Definitions
Obviously, if a conservancy policy is to be established, one has to be clear on the definition of 
the term in international circles. It does not appear in the well-known IUCN categorisation of 
protected areas (cf. Annex t ) and is used loosely in the international environmental literature. 
For Zimbabwean purposes it is more helpful to examine the use of the term as it has arisen in 
the Southern African context, particularly in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe.
1.1 South Africa
While in most South African provinces game farms are required to be licensed, there is 
no statutory definition of a conservancy. They are nevertheless a feature of the 
commercial farming sector in several provinces, being essentially collaborative 
management arrangements between two or more landowners for economic and 
ecological purposes. Their legality derives from civil contract between owners rather 
than statutory mandate. In some instances land set-aside within a private property is 
also termed a conservancy. The various large private complexes next to Kruger NP 
(Sabi Sands, Kiaserie, Selati, Timbavati) are what might be termed conservancies but 
are actually private games reserves owned by eco-tour'ist companies. South Africa thus 
uses the term in three different ways: co-management regimes, land set aside within a 
property, and substantial private game reserves.
Provincial Nature Conservation agencies have supported conservancies in order to 
foster anci facilitate wildlife conservation schemes between commercial farmers. In the 
Free State Province wildlife has been subsidised to conservancies especially where this 
facilitates species conservation objectves The Natal Parks Board has promoted a 
conservancy approach to facilitate water catchment conservation through encouraging 
groups of farmers to monitor the impact of their land management practices 
(deforestation, erosion, aiien vegetation, chemicals etc.) on the health of river systems. 
This approach has similarities to Zimbabwe's Intensive Conservation Areas (ICAs) 
Conservancies in Natal have largely been joint arrangements by neighbouring farmers 
to maintain sufficient wildlife for aesthetic and recreational purposes. They have not 
played a significant role as joint units of production but have played a role in conserving 
species and water catchments and facilitating liaison and co-operation between private 
and communal neighbours.
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Namibia
Since 1968 private landowners in Namibia have enjoyed the right to use and benefit 
from wildlife on their land, subject to certain conditions, importantly these conditions 
included boundary game-proof fencing. Subsequently, economies of scale and the 
ecology of arid lands resulted in the emergence of conservancies. Individual farmers 
sought to pool land and financial resources to create larger units where integrated 
management practices could occur. Government viewed this development positively, 
and in 1991 the Ministry approved a policy on the establishment of conservancies in 
Namibia. This policy defined conservancies as follows:
"A conservancy is a group o f farms on which neighbouring landowners have 
pooled their resources for the purpose o f conserving and utilising wildlife on 
their combined properties. The conservancy concept does not have to be 
restricted to the commercial farming areas, but can be extended to communal 
land as well. “ (Namibia, 1995:2)
The first conservancy under the policy was established in 1992, and has been followed 
by the establishment of others on commercial land. The Ministry of Environment and 
Tourism provides certain extension and inspection services, and the use of wildlife 
operates under permit to ensure sustainability and good practice. It should be noted 
that the devolved proprietorship of wildlife to landowners on which this conservancy 
approach was based has had the following effect in the words of a Ministry policy 
document.
"a) improved conservation o f wildlife on commercial farms as farmers 
realised that they could benefit from the game, and
b) the development o f multi-million Namibian dollar game farming, hunting 
and tourism industries which not only contribute to the economic 
viability o f individual farms, but play an important role in the national 
economy, while requiring very little financial and technological support 
from the State."(Namibia 1995:2)
Since independence Namibia has sought to extend these demonstrated ecological and 
economic benefits to farmers on communal land, in many ways replicating Zimbabwe's 
policy history of extending the wildiife and tourism industry to communal lands through 
the CAMPFIRE Programme However Namibia’s conditions are different, including the 
fact that to date lower tier structures of governance in communal lands are not as 
clearly defined as they are in Zimbabwe. Thus policy has used the conservancy model 
to create the management context for wildlife and natural resource use in communal 
lands.
The promulgation of the 1996 Nature Conservation Amendment Act provides that:
“any group o f people residing on communal land and which desires to have 
the area which they inhabit, o r any part thereof, to be declared a conservancy 
shall apply to the Minister o f Environment and Tourism ... ("conservancy" 
means any area declared a conservancy in terms o f section 24A(2) (ii) - notice  
in the Gazette giving boundaries) " (Namibia 1996:4)
Thus, through application to the Minister to have their land designated a conservancy a 
community can acquire the authority necessary under Namibian wildlife legislation to 
manage and utilise wildlife and natural resources within the designated conservancy 
area. The group's membership must be listed and be structured as a conservancy 
committee, served by a conservancy constitution. The key institutional ingredients are:
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R ierehip; constitution; designated boundaries; administrative and financial ; sustainable management and utilisation objective; accountability; f. The Minister retains regulatory oversight and ultimately may use such 
ctions as withdrawal of recognition, amendment or withdrawal of conditions.
>abws
statutory definition of a conservancy but, under prevailing property iaw and 
_ station, commercial farmers have legally constituted themselves as 
. Conservancies under civil contract. A catalyst in this process was the objective of 
iDNPWLM to develop a translocated breeding nuclei of black rhinos in Zimbabwe. This 
jotjective led to commercial farmers rapidly negotiating common property arrangements 
With their neighbours to establish rhino conservancies. Further, given land use 
\economics, persistent droughts (especially 1991), and emerging wildlife-based 
‘production systems some conservancies rapidly developed towards becoming 
tubstantial private sector-based enterprises. Several properties have been 
amalgamated into a single management complex to enable more effective 
management, utilisation and protection, of some or ail natural resources in that area. 
The rights and privileges, duties and obligations, of conservancies vis- -^vis. the state 
are not coded nor clearly understood at present, giving rise to calls for a Zimbabwean 
conservancy policy and cognate legislation.
To date the conservancy concept in Zimbabwe has been applied only to commercial 
land. In this context one definition has been provided by the study conducted by Price 
Waterhouse and published by the Save Valley, Bubiana and Chiredzi River 
Conservancies. This definition merits extensive quote:
"The term Conservancy can be applied to any number o f properties which are 
amalgamated into a single complex in order to enable more effective 
management, utilization and protection o f some or all natural resources in that 
area. In the case o f the lowveld Conservancies, they are developed on the 
principle that in arid regions, rangeland resources need to be managed a t a 
larger scale than individual farms, in order to cope with a variable and  
unpredictable environment.
The Conservancies under consideration are a ll managed in terms o f  
agreements between the members, although the content o f these agreements 
varies according to the aims o f the members. The main focus o f the  
Conservancy agreements is cooperative management o f  the wildlife resource. 
However, this focus can also be extended to cooperative business ventures 
between Conservancy members."
(Save Valley, Bubiana and Chiredzi River Conservancies, 1994:2)
The Conservancy constitutions are built around four main principles (Du Toit 
1992:298):
a) That internal fencing is limited, in order not to  divide a Conservancy into 
compartments, and thereby interfere with the natural movement and 
breeding of animals.
b) In the event that a Conseivancy property passes into the hands of an 
agency whose land use and wildlife management practices are not 
consistent with the Conservancy's, that property will be excised from the 
Conservancy, and Conservancy assets retrieved.
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c) The members are jointly responsible for meeting recurrent management 
costs.
d) Management of the Conservancy wildlife is based on sound scientific 
principles.
The Conservancy developments are motivated by the need for:
e) Greater economic and ecological resilience in tne face of drought.
f) More efficient and sustainable use of key resources in the areas, by 
virtue of the greater diversity, biomass and mobility of wildlife populations 
in the larger, unfenced area.
g) Spreading risks.
h) Resource management at a more appropriate scale.
In addition, there are several aspects to the conservation rationale for the
Conservancies:
i) Their potential for contributing to the conservation of endangered 
species.
j) Their potential to make a general contribution to wildlife conservation by 
making a larger and more natural range available, especially for large 
game species.
k) Their potential to contribute to soil and water conservation, and thereby 
assist in the recovery of degraded ecosystems in the Lowveld.
l) Conservancies afford the opportunity to plan beyond the colonial 
boundaries of properties which often fragmented natural ecological 
areas.
m) Single landowners on restricted properties often cannot achieve the 
economies of scale necessary for a big game wildlife enterprise.
n) Conservancies would significantly add to the tourist destinations 
available in Zimbabwe, especially in the south east and west of the 
country and therefore help create sufficient product for a viable regional 
industry. (Save, Bubiana and Chiredzi River Conservancies 1994:2-3; 
Wildlife Working Group 1996:25)
1.4 A Working Definition in the Zimbabwean Context
From the discussion above certain generalisations can be made:
a) Motivation for the establishment of conservancies in ail three countries 
include ecological, economic and managerial objectives.
b) A fundamental characteristic in all instances is that a conservancy is a 
collaborative institution, involving two or more land and natural resource 
owners/users. It is in effect a co-management or partnership agreement 
between recognised proprietors serving both private (individualised and 
collective) and joint ends.
c) An important implication of b) above is that the term should not be 
applied to utilisation or conservation enterprises under single and sole 
management A farm or a ranch which on its own includes wildlife or
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tourism in its production and management regime is not per se a 
conservancy because the collaborative institutional component is 
absent. Wildlife and tourism enterprises on discrete farms or ranch units 
may well require policy attention, but the issues involved should be 
approached separately from any consideration of conservancy policy.
d) While the conservancy policy has largely been applied only to 
commercial and private land to date, there is no intrinsic reason why it 
cannot include other tenure categories, as the Namibian example 
shows. Indeed the economic, ecological and managerial rationale for 
conservancies (cf. (a) above) implies that it can be effective across 
tenure categories in a number of combinations, (cf. section 3 below.)
With these generalisations in mind, we recommend that discussion on conservancy 
policy in Zmbabwe should proceed with the following definition:
A conservancy shall be defined as a contractually legitimated co-management 
entity which involves two or more recognised land and resource authorities 
formed for the use and conservation of natural resources on land under their 
jurisdiction.
We emphasise that this is a working definition for policy debate and recognise that a forma! 
legal definition could require elaboration. For the purposes of this paper with its focus on the 
CAMPFIRE programme it is important to note that this working definition creates the possibility 
for formal participation in conservancies by RDCs.
2. Background Issues for Conservancy Policy in Zimbabwe
2.1 Land Use Based on Wildlife Tourism
Wildlife as a land use has been established in both the private (commercial) and 
communal (RDC) land sectors of Zimbabwe over the past decade. This has been the 
outcome of a policy which empowered local land owners (private) or holders 
(communal) to manage and utilise their wildlife. In the communal setting positive 
conditions have been provided by. proximity to protected areas, and existent habitat 
and resources combined with low human population densities. In the commercial 
setting proximity to state protected iand has not been as significant. Rather, the critical 
condition has been the potential productivity and profitability of wildlife in comparison to 
cattle, especially in the drought prone semi-arid areas. Management and capital is 
considered better applied to wildlife than livestock.
2.2 Land Use and Natural Region (NR)
Carrying capacity of communal areas is closeiy correlated with Natural Region, with 
higher capacity in NRs li and III than NRs IV and V. The existence of irrigation 
schemes in dry regions effectively create areas like NRs it and III within the broader 
classification NRs IV and V are characterised as severe risk regions for crop 
production and high risk for livestock production beyond the very extensive. In the 
commercial sector the drier the region the larger the unit of production. This recognises 
the tendency for crop production to give way to rangeland management as rainfall 
drops. The extensive ranches characteristic of NRs IV and V are of a scale suitable for 
wildlife production. A conservancy between several such units produces habitat of a 
sufficient scale to sustain extensive and diverse wildlife populations, especially 'big
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game'. These economic and ecological considerations dictate that conservancies are 
more likely to arise in NRs IV and V, as at present.
However it should not be assumed that the right conditions for a conservancy can only 
be found in NRs IV and V. Market proximity and/or specific tourism features could 
make a conservancy in NRs I - 111 the most economically productive form of land use in 
specific circumstances. One can envisage this, for instance, near Harare (NR ii) or in 
Nyanga (NRI). This indicates the weakness of using natural region categories as the 
sole criterion for the determination of the location of conservancies. These categories 
are broad-brush divisions of the Zimbabwean iandscape for analytic and general 
descriptive purposes. They are insufficiently disagregated for detailed planning and 
mask the micro-ecological variation which exists in each of them, it would be unwise for 
conservancy policy to use these categories as substantive criteria on their own. Policy 
should rather be based on a principle which situates conservancies where they are the 
best form of land use, economic and financial, for a given micro-environment in terms 
of economic, ecological and managerial criteria.
2.3 Land Tenure
Secure tenure is the bedrock of sustainable resource use, including conservancies. 
Tenure over the land is fundamental but also tenuriai niches related to specific 
resources (eg. wildlife, forest products, water, minerals) can be recognised. A 
conservancy in our definition is basically an association of tenuriai units. In Zimbabwe, 
the classic tenuriai classifications are private (large and small scale, and resettlement 
farmers), communal (RDCs are land authorities) and state land holdings. State and 
communal tenure involves central and local governmental authorities and the latter 
must also accommodate the legitimacy of customary authorities, it is possible to 
conceive a conservancy involving a single tenuriai category, or any combination of 
them.
2.4 Equity Considerations
Zimbabwean policy has been to maintain the tenuriai classifications mentioned above. 
At the same time, however, it is a policy imperative that the issues of equity and 
indigenisatiori be addressed. These are pervasive policy issues and any consideration 
of conservancy policy cannot afford to ignore them. Current Government approaches 
reveal a concern about socio-economic equity focused at two levels: (a) access by 
communal farmers to land; and (b) access by an emerging indigenous elite to land 
and capital,
There are inherent tensions in the simultaneous resolution of these two concerns. Land 
reform and the transformation of large commercial holdings into small holdings may 
reduce opportunities for black elite entry into the large-scale commercial sector. It may 
also reduce tne viability of the land holdings concerned and thus worsen the lot of the 
indigenous investors. Indigenisation, if focused solely on black elite entry to the large 
scale agricultural, wildlife and tourism sectors, will not adequately address the equity 
issue, even if popular with powerful pressure groups.
These contextualising macro-policy issues have an important bearing on the 
development of any conservancy approach. Currently Government manifests an 
ambivalence regarding the concept. While it is recognised that conservancies may be a 
sound land use, the current racial composition of their participants means that
Government is ambivalent about supporting conservancies unless they address the 
dual equity issues, land reform and indigenisatlon, outiinea above
The land reform issue centres on resource endowment as well as ownership. The 
private farmer has more resources and more secure tenurial rights. The core of this 
issue revolves around the socio-political acceptability of having substantial land tracts 
under the control of a small elite juxtaposed to a subsistence smallholding communal 
peasantry. What can conservancies do to help the majority of rural people meet their 
basic needs? Conservancies cannot be istands of sustainable development but must 
also address the challenge of considering the need for wider participation in the 
process, exists and benefits. Where a conservancy is situated solely in the commercial 
sector a significant opportunity cost is the acceptance by tne communal people of the 
exclusive access of a few farmers to conservancy resources. Skewed ethnic 
participation within conservancies means there can be no multiracial middle class 
alliance acting as an effective constituency to encourage conservancy development.
Unless public and political perceptions of conservancies as a device inhibiting larger 
scale equity and indigenisation imperatives are changed to a perception that 
conservancies can be an approach contributing to their resolution, it is unlikely that any 
viable and durable conservancy policy wiil be forthcoming. While this paper attempts 
no detailed list of prescriptions to achieve this we do make the following observations:
* Participation in conservancies on large-scale commercial farm land must be 
significantly indigenised. Per se this falls in the realm of indigenisation and land 
policy rather than conservancy policy but it must be recognised as an enabling 
condition. The substantive economic, ecological and managerial arguments 
remain and are of as much importance to the black elite as they are to white elite. 
There are practicai problems to be faced. These Include the fact that significant 
investment is presently being made through loss of earnings, restocking, fencing, 
etc. Tnis is often being done in recognition of the future prospects and because 
of the lack of viability with cattle.
* The greatest potential in the conservancy approach to address equity issues will 
arise, however, when it is applied across tenure categories. As conservancies are 
created which involve contractual relationships of benefit and responsibility 
between, for example, commercial and communal farmers, linkages of mutual 
benefit are put in place which instigate a process to ameliorate inequity.
* CAMPFIRE programme objectives stand to gain by the creation of such trans- 
tenure category conservancies where ecologically and economically viable zones 
provide the potential to enhance opportunities for small-scale farmers to 
collectively enter large scale wildlife and tourism enterprises. Many of these 
farmers are in areas rich in resource capital, and properly orchestrated 
conservancy involvement could mean for them an indigenisation in the wildlife 
and tourism industries which goes beyond that of an entrepreneurial business 
elite.
3. Typology
We have previously noted (section 1.4 d) that the conservancy approach can and should be 
applied across tenure categories, A variety of tenure contexts or combinations of them are 
possible. In this section we provide a brief discussion of possible types and combinations 
Further elaboration by example is provided in section 4.
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1 Private Owners
rirte beat known examples are Save, Chiredzi River, Bubiana, and Gwaai River. Ail 
rthese are in NRs IV and V and share some common characteristics:
3.1.1 They are ait mutual arrangements between private land-owners primarily 
concerned with running economically and ecologically sound wildlife- 
based businesses;
3.1.2 They all share boundaries, more or less, with communal or state land;
3.1.3 They all depend on a supportive DNPWLM policy related to purchase Of 
live animals from the national estate or other private wildlife owners. For 
example, Save; Conservancy plans to stock their area and intend to raise 
substantia! funds for that purpose. Would DNPWLM sell them wildlife 
and under what conditions?
3.1.4 The majority are involved in the national rhino protection strategy.
3.1.5 A historical perspective must be maintained. Buffalo present a case in 
point. Save Valley’s last buffalo were culled (by Government) in the mid 
1980’s through FMD control. At the time, the landowners were promised 
(by Government) that they would have preferential access to buffalo if, 
and when, that became an issue again.
3.2 Private / Communal Conservancies
The Save Valley Conservancy (SVC) has proposed a structure which would formally 
bind the conservancy with its communal neighbours. Five RDCs have resolved to 
establish a Joint Management Committee (JMC) and collaborate with the SVC 
Committee in a Joint Working Committee. This type of private/communal conservancy 
management is discussed further in section 4
3.3 RDC (communal) / RDC (communal) Conservancies
There are many examples where two or more RDCs implementing CAMPFIRE could 
establish a conservancy linking their projects. Inyanga North and Mudzi RDCs have a 
joint project in the Rwenya river area; Mudzi, Rushinga, and UMP RDCs collaborate in 
the Mazowe river area. Potentially, there are many examples where the boundary 
between RDC CAMPFIRE projects requires joint management and planning. A 
conservancy framework could usefully bind wards on either side of an RDC boundary 
into a joint management regime. Each RDC would legitimate the conservancy by- 
delegating some managerial authority to a joint management unit.
3.4 RDC (communal) / State Conservancies
Taking the example of the Kariba iakeshore and more particularly the Sengwa river, it is 
possible to imagine DNPWLM, Binga and Kariba RDCs establishing a joint 
management plan. Such a plan might be a sub-set of a Iakeshore management plan. 
Examples are many as effectively all planning of protected and communal area 
boundaries could be considered. This is probably unnecessary but the contested buffer 
zones between parks and communities could be considered co-management/ 
conservancy zones. Several ether examples can be given. Bulilimamangwe RDC is 
interested in exploring the possibility of designating some of the resettlement ranches 
in the district as conservancies and linking them with its CAMPFIRE programme and 
private sector initiatives in the district. Smali state managed protected areas like Tuli,
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brudzi and Chipinge Safari Areas could link with adjacent communal (RDC) areas, 
i precedent actually exists with the Dande and Malapati Safari Areas where, 
jugh these are state lands, the DNPWLM has allowed benefits to be appreciated 
p y  CAMPFIRE communities.
IU  State / Private Conservancies
This is a further combination which can be considered. Given the new statutory fund 
status of DNPWLM, arrangements between the parks estate and conservancies can 
now be envisaged. Some linkage between the Chipinge Safari Area and Save River 
Conservancy might serve a mutual collaborative goal. This also applies to Forestry 
Commission land and the Gwaai River Conservancy.
| 3.6 State / Private / Communal (RDC) Conservancies
An example is that of the Maliangwe Trust which owns land adjacent to both Gona re 
Zhou and Chiredzi RDC. These three land authorities need to communicate and plan 
together to avoid conflicts over land use, as well as cost and benefit allocation. Should 
all three parties evolve a plan which incorporated joint land or wildlife use then that 
would serve as a form of conservancy incorporating all three land classifications and 
their respective management authorities. The possibility cf linkage between the Save 
Conservancy, Chipinge Safari Area and Chipinge RDC (communal) land is a further 
practical example.
3.7 Conservancies as a Mechanism of Refining CAMPFIRE Policy
DNPWLM has granted appropriate authority to some 26 RDCs. Less than a quarter of 
the communal land under these RDCs could be considered viable wildlife habitat. Were 
a conservancy approach adopted which focused on strategic management zones a 
more supportive management, framework might be fostered. For example, the three 
wards in western Dande under Guruve RDCs appropriate authority might form a 
conservancy which had clear institutional rights and obligations. In addition, through 
the Dande Safari Area, DNPWLM could be a conservancy partner. Many examples 
exist, another being the relationship between Tsholotsho and Buiilimamangwe. An 
early attempt by these two districts to run a joint CAMPFIRE scheme was thwarted, 
partly because the two districts are in different provinces. A conservancy approach 
might be a way of softening hard administrative boundaries in order to achieve optimal 
management units from an ecological and financial perspective. The DNPWLM could 
use this approach to secure a positive and instrumental role in refining CAMPFIRE 
policy, as it could oversee a clear devolution, separation, and balance of powers 
between central, RDC, and community levels within the programme. This may be the 
way to proceed, rather than granting authority to single wards and villages The 
conservancy would be a middle structure between village/ward, and RDC. This couid 
also be a mechanism for rationalising safari concessions and ward boundaries.
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eSome Concrete Zimbabwe Examples 
4.1 Save Valley Conservancy (SVC)
There are several ways by which neighbouring communities could have a reai 
investment in a private conservancy e.g.:
a) DNPWLM grants wildlife translocated to conservancies as an equity 
investment on behalf of communities.
b) Private sector grants communities a benefit in return for share of costs. 
There are several ways this could happen, perhaps the most profound 
would be where communal or resettlement land was invested by the 
landholders into the conservancy. This would make communities full 
shareholding participants rather than neighbouring joint-venture 
partners.
c) Donor grant funds buy wildlife from state/private sector for a community 
to invest in a neighbouring conservancy.
The SVC proposed option c) by which a donor grants funds to stock the conservancy 
with wildlife as an equity investment, in perpetuity, for the communities. A legai Trust 
would hold the equity and receive an annual dividend (interest, benefit) from the 
conservancy. SVC has presented such a proposal to neighbouring communities 
through their 5 respective RDCs. The RDCs would raise funds to buy wildlife through 
their trust structure and thereby the communities would have "ownership" of wildlife and 
be full co-management parties.
Some apparent constraints in the Save proposal are:
d) Donors may be reluctant to make a grant to communities which also 
benefits the private sector despite the fact that communities and private 
sector request it partly because of the lack of viable alternatives.
e) Donors want central government support for the idea which, without a 
policy guideline, is hard to secure.
f) The SVC proposal addresses equity in regard to local communities but 
not participation by indigenous private landowners in the conservancy.
g) There is no national forum through which the SVC can constructively 
work through the policy process.
While central government seems pressured to indigenise conservancies, RDCs seem 
more concerned to empower communal neighbours. At present, the major 
stakeholders in regard to private sector conservancies appear to be: the commercial 
farmers; the communal farmers; the RDCs, indigenous business interests; and the 
DNPWLM.
in regard to facilitating the policy process it must be recognised that since the 
DNPWLM attained Fund status it is now both a regulator and an interested parry. How 
far this might preclude DNPWLM from being an 'honest broker1 is unclear. Further, who 
actually represents the indigenous business interests?
For communities various participation permutations are possible (e.g. gate / bed levies 
etc.) but only "ownership" of conservancy wildlife or land would give them a substantial 
equity stake. Some communities, particularly the resettlement areas around the SVC,
could put land into the conservancy and thereby gain a substantial participation but this
to
would probably not be possible for all neighbouring communities. The SVC might 
consider granting communities benefits from a designated specie (e.g. buffalo or 
elephant), In the case of. the rhino, a protected specie, the DNPWLM, could possibly 
facilitate this. To be financially viable the SVC needs to invest in wild stock and 
therefore they must either secure loans, or a grant through the community trust. If the 
SVC borrows they will have to pay interest which reduces their ability and obligation to 
fund the Trust. Although levies could help they woutd not give the communities (RDCs) 
real ownership and the conservancy would resemble a "parks and neighbours" type 
programme of the Kenyan model, where the neighbours have little say in terms of 
nanagement.
1.2 Mavuradona Wilderness
'he Mavuradona wilderness provides an example where a RDC set aside communal 
ind for tne conservation and sustainable use of wildlife. The initiation of the project 
wolved collaboration between the local authority and commercial farmers. The 
tructure is not formally collaborative but commercial farmers have access to the 
lanagement structure of the RDC. Muzarabani RDC has also recognised the vested 
iterests of communal neighbours resident in Guruve RDC, Whereas a formally 
tructurec! conservancy would have direct representation of the two RDCs and the 
cmmerc al farmers this has not occurred as the wilderness area is wholly within 
luzarabani RDC. Should the commercial farmers or Guruve RDC contribute land then 
lat would constitute the basis for a co-management, or conservancy approach. The 
isson perhaps is that neighbours may be beneficiaries and pay some conservation 
osts, but are not the primary managers as they do not have land, or animals, in the 
conservancy. However, because Muzarabani's animals might wander onto neighbours 
lands they have a right to some beneficiary status.
4.3 Game Farms and Wilderness Sites
Some commercial farmers may set aside land for wildlife and call it a conservancy. 
Some game farms may have specially protected zones within them for the security of 
rare spec.es and call them conservancies e.g. a rhino conservancy within a game farm. 
This couid also occur on RDC/communal iand as is already the case in Gatshe Gatshe 
and the Sanyati areas where ihe RDCs have designated (and as wild iand for an eco- 
tourist use This does not fit our working definition of the term, and in our view (of. 1,4.c 
above) such arrangements should have another name to avoid terminological 
confusions.
4.4 Kariba Lakeshore
The Kariba lakeshore encompasses several land authorities - DNPWLM, Kariba RDC, 
Kariba TO, and Binga RDC. DNPWLM has responsibility both for protected land and 
for the lake recreational zone. In addition the Zambian authorities also have a 
substantial legal stake. The establishment of the combination authority under the Town 
and Country Planning Act is an attempt to formalise a planning and management 
mechanism to lock the Zimbabwean authorities into a co-ordinated planning system.
At a more micro level the DNPWLM shares several riverine boundaries with communal 
areas. These can be conflict zones between artisanal and recreationai fishing. In 
addition these rivers are also habitat for crocodile populations which wili nest on both 
sides of the river, it would be possible to see these rivers (e.g. Ume, Sanyati, Sengwa 
etc.) as conservancies, where the conservancy exists to bring DNPWLM and the local
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authorities together into a joint management structure for the specific purpose of 
ensuring collaboration for managing the use of riverine habitat.
The example of Lake Kariba could introduce the concept of an international 
conservancy area to avoid conflicting resource use practices between different 
countries. Thus the 'trans-frontier' parks are examples of what could be a conservancy 
approach. However, issues of scale and the intricacies of integrated management and 
benefit flows leads us to doubt the viability of trying to make the entire Kariba/Zambezi 
area a conservancy as we have defined it The challenge in this case would be more a 
icern for co-ordination and control than joint financial enterprise.
vernments Role in the Conservancy Policy Process
he concept of conservancy, as has been defined here, would be a powerful management tool 
br developing collaborative synergy between land authorities (state, private, communal) and 
reating integrated units of management. However, policy in relation to conservancies and the 
IAMPFIRE Programme is only an aspect of the overarching wildlife policy which defines the 
slationship between "responsible" and "appropriate" management regimes.
lovernment needs to manage policy as a process, not a centrally-driven event, facilitating a 
ildlife-based economy as much as regulating it Structural change and policy review 
Taracterise the present situation, driven by DNPWLM’s restructuring, fund status and 
jvernment’s equity policy which might make contest and conflict inevitable. However, by 
anaging policy as a process in a transparent and accountable way DNPWLM cannot be 
ulted.
I.ie National Parks Department should be clear of its own roie in each phase of the policy irocess, particularly the implementation. Previously DNPWIM was the responsible authority nd manager of all wildlife but since the 1975 Act (amended 1982) it has used its authority to 
Irant "appropriate authority" status to the private and communal tenurial sectors. The precise 
lature of that relationship requires some evaluation of, inter alia, the following policy 
lomponents:
I) Extension Should the Department develop a "community conservation" branch to 
facilitate and manage its collaborative activities and relations with the private and 
communal sector?
b) Regulation. Which activities and actions by "appropriate authorities" require permission 
still being granted by the "responsible authority" (e g. exports, translocations, trophy 
quotas, exotics, protected species etc.)? What methods would be most effective and 
efficient in managing the regulatory role (permits, licenses, permissions, oversight, 
inspection, etc.)?
5) Monitoring. What information needs to be exchanged between the "responsible" and 
"appropriate" authorities related to wildlife status and management? As DNPWLM is 
the agency accountable for all wildlife at the level of the state, what monitoring 
information does it minimally or optimally need?
i) Enforcement. DNPWLM must be able to police its own estate and rules and 
regulations and also be in a position to assist the "appropriate authorities" in the 
discharge of their own enforcement requirements
i) Control. DNPWLM must have a capacity to protect the public from wildlife when 
necessary. While "appropriate authorities" have to accept, in many cases, the
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management Qf this problem. Ultimately DNPWLM is likely to continue to have a role in 
this issue.
The above policy components generally apply to the overall policy environment related to the 
management of wildlife outside the Parks' estate of which conservancy policy, as defined here, 
would be a specific sub-set. DNPWLM could choose to sanction the existent conservancies as 
legitimate developments based on civil contract and present wildlife legislation, or establish 
criteria by which they could be sanctioned. Views will differ on how regulatory DNPWLM ought 
to be or how self-regulatory divisions of the wildlife industry should be.
The model since independence has been to decentralise authority to landowners, with 
DNPWLM retaining residual right of overeight and regulation. As a Fund DNPWLM needs to 
reassure the public that its financial interest in the wildlife industry will not jeopardise its 
conservation imperative. Undoubtedly, there is a leadership role in the entire policy process for 
Parks', including implementation For optimal efficiency in realising a common vision on 
sustainable self regulation the DNPWLM should rely more on positive incentives than on 
negative sanctions. There should be a clear set of objectives and institutional roles for 
DNPWLM, producer associations and producers.
The working relationship between DNPWLM, private and communal sectors would not always 
be hierarchical, between "regulator" and "regulated", but would also manifest aspects of co­
operation. Conservancies, as co-management entities, provide the prospect of the country 
enhancing its conservation status as well as development opportunities through establishing 
partnerships at a scale conducive to both. By fulfilling two of the objectives enshrined in the 
Convention on EJiodiversity (conservation and sustainable use) the issue remains to address 
the third objective, socio-economic equity and political acceptability. DNPWLM is therefore 
challenged to build ori the decentralisation process by encouraging co-management regimes. 
In this process DNPWLM has some distinct strengths it is the "responsible authority", it has 
assets (parks estate) and the means (fund status) to contribute positively to the policy process 
through direct participation in the implementation phase.
With regard to developing a conservancy policy which facilitates the relationship between 
state, private and communal sectors the following cycle could be borne in mind (Brewer and 
de Leon 1983).
The process begins with a policy identification phase which identifies the strengths and 
weaknesses of the present policy in the light of the opportunities and threats presented 
by the wider ecological, social, economic and political environment. Present policy is 
centred on devolution of management and authority to landowners (private sector) and 
landholders (communal sector) This has been successful in establishing positive 
management incentives, noting that CAMPFIRE manifests some dissonance between 
the units of authority (RDC) and management (community). Further, DNPWLM may 
have experienced problems defining its role in the decentralised approach. For 
example, how much information and regulatory control does DNPWLM need to ensure 
its overall responsibility? How much of an extension service should DNPWLM provide 
to the private and communal sectors? How much can it realistically expect to efficiently 
carry out in these activities, given its resource constraints?
The evaluation of the present policy options for adaptation should be estimated with the 
full participation of stakeholders. In this estimation phase of conservancy policy, fora 
should be established to solicit views on the identified policy options. Issues, visions, 
objectives and models should be debated, it is essential to the public interest that 
communication is open and consensus a goal and therefore information sharing, 
mediation and conflict resolution would characterise this phase.
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Once the policy options have been estimated the process can move into a selection 
phase. As many differences and conflicts as possible should be resolved before final 
selection. Presently, conflict seems focused on the equity issue (communal benefit/ 
indigenisatiori) and the respective roles of the state, private and communal sectors 
along a regulatory to self regulatory continuum
The selection phase establishes the main objectives, incentives, roles and 
responsibilities of stakeholders in order that the implementation phase can have the 
best possible chance of success. Lessons should be taken from CAMPFIRE where a 
great deal of policy estimation has taken place during the implementation phase 
Ideally, implementation should be an incentive-ied activity, closeiy monitored in order to 
adapt the incentive and regulatory aspects. To fine-tune a policy in the implementation 
phase is acceptable but major changes would indicate failure in the estimation and 
selection phases.
After a period of time, which in regard to a policy for tourism-based conservancies 
would be from 5 to 10 years, there should be an evaluation phase, after which the cycle 
returns to identification of potential improvements, estimation, selection and 
implementation of any major structural changes felt necessary.
Conclusion
iny policy related to wildlife conservancies depends on a clear definition of the term. The 
lefinition given will determine the utility of conservancy as a concept, structure and 
iianagement tool. If the term is defined too broadly (any wildlife management activity outside 
lie Parks and Wild Life Estate) or too narrowly (a private sector game farm or ranch) then it 
Mould lose its pertinence as a specific form of wildlife management. Defined as a co- 
nanagement entity made of land and resource authorities it can constitute an approach of 
treat significance to the CAMPFIRE programme, particularly when these entities cut across 
surrent tenure categories.
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